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Abstract
A web application could be visited for different purposes. It is possible for the resources
(web pages, images, flash objects, etc.) provided by a web application to be visited by a
regular user as a normal (natural) visit, to be viewed by crawlers, bots, spiders etc. for
indexing purposes, or to be exploratory scanned by malicious users prior to an attack. In
this thesis, a method; that can be used to detect attack-oriented scans and to distinguish
them from two other types of visits, has been proposed. This method is also implemented
with a Python script.
To detect these malicious scans, there are different detection mechanisms such as web
application firewalls, machine learning based predictive detection techniques etc. In the
scope of the thesis, static access log files of Apache (or ISS) web servers are used as
an input and attack situations have been tried to be determined in such a way as to
allow the examination of the past data. An attack targeted website scan can be viewed
as a phase of a potential attack and can lead to more attack detection as compared
to traditional detection methods. In addition to web scan detections, an extra rule set
has been inserted to detect two largely common injection attacks in OWASP Top 10
Vulnerabilities.
Detection rules proposed in the thesis have been applied on sample data sets and eval-
uations have been made on these data sets that are both closed and open to external
traffic. Moreover, results have been analysed in terms of accuracy rate, precision etc.
to compare presented method and other commonly used detection techniques, and to
remark its disadvantages and advantages. Furthermore, various tests have been made
on log samples from real systems. Lastly, several suggestions about further development
have also been discussed.
Keywords: rule-based model, log analysis, scan detection, web application security, xss
and sqli detection
Apache HTTP Sunucusu İzleme Kayıtlarından Saldırı Amaçlı
Yapılan Taramaların Tespiti
Merve BAŞ SEYYAR
Öz
Bir web uygulaması farklı amaçlar için ziyaret edilebilir. Web uygulamaları ziyaretçi-
leri için web sayfaları, resimler, flash nesneleri vb. kaynaklar sağlamaktadır. Bu kay-
nakların normal (doğal) ziyaret amacıyla kötü niyetli olmayan kullanıcılar tarafından;
dizinleme amacıyla web gezginleri, web robotları, web örümcekleri vb. tarafından ya da
saldırı amaçlı tarama yapmak için ise kötü niyetli kullanıcılar tarafından ziyaret edilmesi
mümkündür. Bu tezde saldırı odaklı taramaları tespit etmek ve bu taramaları diğer iki
tür kullanıcı ziyaretinden ayırmak için kullanılabilecek bir model önerilmiştir. Ayrıca bu
yöntem bir Python betiği ile uygulanmıştır.
Kötü niyetli taramaları saptamak için web uygulama güvenlik duvarları, makine öğrenimi
tabanlı tespit teknikleri vb. farklı tespit mekanizmaları bulunmaktadır. Saldırı hedefli
açıklık taramaları, olası bir web saldırısının önemli bir safhası olarak görülebilir ve ge-
leneksel algılama yöntemlerine kıyasla daha fazla saldırı tespit edilmesini sağlayabilir. Bu
tez kapsamında Apache (veya ISS) web sunucusu statik erişim kayıt dosyaları girdi olarak
kullanılmış ve saldırı durumları geçmiş verilerin incelenmesi ile belirlenmeye çalışılmıştır.
Buna ek olarak, OWASP İlk 10 Güvenlik Açıklığı Listesinde yer alan ve yaygın olarak
kullanılan enjeksiyon saldırılarını tespit etmek için de bir kural seti eklenmiştir.
Tezde önerilen tespit kuralları hem iç hem de dış ağ trafiği içeren örnek veri kümeleri
üzerinde uygulanmış ve model değerlendirmesi yapılmıştır. Ek olarak, sunulan yöntem
ile sıkça kullanılan diğer tespit teknikleri karşılaştırılmış ve modelin dezavantajları ve
avantajlarını belirlemek için doğruluk oranı, hassaslık vb. ölçüler kullanılarak sonuçlar
analiz edilmiştir. Ayrıca, gerçek sistemlerden alınmış kayıt örnekleri üzerinde de çeşitli
testler yapılmıştır. Son olarak, modelin geliştirilmesi amaçlı öneriler tartışılmıştır.
Anahtar Sözcükler: kural tabanlı model, kayıt analizi, tarama tespiti, web uygulama
guvenliği, xss ve sqli atakları tespiti
This thesis is dedicated to my dear and immortal father MEHMET
BAŞ.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The dependency to web systems; consisting of web services and web applications is
increasing in parallel with the people’s requirements [1]. From health sector to electronic
commerce (e-commerce), internet usage is needed in all areas of life. After the spread
of cloud technology; there is no doubt that this dependency will increase even more
[2]. However, web environment is hosting billions of users of any nature including script
kiddies, cyber terrorists etc. Malicious users might pose a threat which varies according
to their motivation.
Attack surface of the web systems is large enough to make an intrusion attempt quite
easily [3]. According to European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA)
Threat Landscape 2015 (ETL 2015) [4], web based and web applications attacks are
ranked as number two and three, and their rankings have remained unchanged between
2014 and 2015. Since web security related threats have been perpetually evolving, web
applications are more disposed to security risks. Also, attack methods to web applications
are very diverse and their trends continue for a long time [5]. For instance, although
Structured Query Language (SQL) injection and Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) seem to be
at a decreasing rate in 2014, an increase in their exposures is seen in 2015. Therefore,
one may easily deduce that web systems are in the focus of cyber criminals.
Having vulnerabilities is very common among web sites [6]. Web application security
scanners are usually used to test web applications for information security issues and
identify vulnerabilities [7]. Their utilization may be also needed for security assessments
and regulatory compliances. On the other hand, for an attacker, web vulnerability scan
1
Chapter 1. Introduction 2
is the required exploration before further exploitation. This is also the reason why the
web applications are getting exposed to the attack-oriented scans. The increase in the
attackers’ usage of publicly available and easy to use web vulnerability scanners and
exploiting tools is one of the negative aspects in web security threat environment.
As a matter of fact, the detection of these malicious scans becomes very crucial to prevent
web applications from exploitation and to take effective countermeasures as immediate as
possible. Because, an overlooked vulnerability scan may result in a large scale problems
such as information leakage, privacy violation etc.
To detect all of mentioned attacks and scans, analysing the log files is usually preferred.
Two primary reasons for this preference are that log files are easily available, and there is
no need for expensive hardware for analysis [8]. In addition, logs may provide successful
detection especially for encrypted protocols such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Secure
Shell Daemon (SSHD) etc. [9]. However, the heavier the website’s traffic is, the more
difficult the examination of the log files gets. Therefore, the need for an user-friendly
web vulnerability scan detection tool by analysing log files seems pretty obvious.
1.1 Related Work
Unlike vulnerability scan detection, there exists plenty of research related to detection of
web application attacks. Within this section, the most related surveys for vulnerability
scan detection have been reviewed.
Auxilia et. al. suggest a negative security model for intrusion detections in web applica-
tions [10]. This method is one of the dynamic detection techniques that is anomaly-based.
The authors propose to use Web Application Firewall (WAF) with a rule set protecting
web applications from unknown vulnerabilities. When analysed their rules for Hyper-
text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) attacks detection, the rules appears to be generated by
checking the values of some important HTTP header fields, Uniform Resource Identifier
(URI) strings, cookies etc. Associating WAF, Intrusion Detection System (IDS), rule
engine reasoning together makes this article interesting.
Goseva-Popstojanova et al. [11] propose a method to classify malicious web sessions
through web server logs. Firstly, the authors constitute four different data sets from
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honeypots; on which several web applications were installed. Afterwards, 43 different
features were extracted from web sessions to characterize each session and three machine
learning methods that are Support Vector Machine (SVM), J48 and Partial Decision
Trees (PART) were used to make the classifications. The authors assert that when all
43 features used in learning period, their method to distinguish between attack and vul-
nerability scan sessions attains high accuracy rates with low probability of false alarms.
This comprehensive research provides significant contribution in the area of web security.
Different from log analysis, Husák et al. [12] would rather analyse extended network flow
and parse HTTP requests. In addition to some Open Systems Interconnection (OSI)
Layer 3 and Layer 4 data, the extracted HTTP information from network flow includes
host name, path, user agent, request method, response code, referrer and content type
fields. To group network flow in three classes such as repeated requests, HTTP scans,
and web crawlers; source Internet Protocol (IP), destination IP, and requested Uniform
Resource Locator (URL) split into domain and path are used. One of the interesting
results they obtain is that the paths requested for HTTP scans are also requested for
brute-force attack as well. However, not only HTTP requests but also HTTP responds
should also be analysed to get more effective results.
After a learning period of non-malicious HTTP logs, Zolotukhin et al [13] analyse HTTP
requests in an on-line mode to detect network intrusions. Normal user behaviour,
anomalies related features and intrusions detection are extracted from web resources,
queries attributes and user agent values respectively. The authors compare five dif-
ferent anomaly-detection methods; that are Support Vector Data Description (SVDD),
K-means, Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN), Self-
Organizing Map (SOM) and Local Outlier Factor (LOF), according to their accuracy
rates in detecting intrusions. It is asserted that simulations results show higher accuracy
rates compared to the other data-mining techniques.
Session Anomaly Detection (SAD) is a method developed by Cho and Cha [14] as a
Bayesian estimation technique. In this model, web sessions are extracted from web logs
and are labelled as "normal" or "abnormal" depending on whether it is below or above the
assigned threshold value. In addition, two parameters that are page sequences and their
frequency are investigated in training data. In order to test their results; the authors use
Whisker v1.4 as a tool for generating anomalous web requests and it is asserted that The
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Bayesian estimation technique has been successful for detecting 91% of all anomalous
requests. Therefore, two points making this article different from the others are that
SAD can be customized by choosing site-dependent parameters; and the false positive
rates gets lower with web topology information.
In their work, Stevanovic et al. [15] use SOM and Modified Adaptive Resonance Theory
2 (Modified ART2) algorithms for training and 10 features related to web sessions for
clustering. Then, the authors label these sessions as human visitors, well-behaved web
crawlers, malicious crawlers and unknown visitors. In addition to classifying web sessions,
similarities among the browsing styles of Google, MSN, and Yahoo are also analysed in
this article. The authors obtain lots of interesting results, one of which is that 52% of
malicious web crawlers and human visitors are similar in their browsing strategies; which
means that it is hard to distinguish each other.
There are several differences between our work and the above mentioned works. Firstly,
as in the most of the related works, checking only the user-agent header field from
a list is not enough to detect web crawlers in the correct way. In the direction of
this observation, we add extra fields to check to make the web crawler detection more
accurate. Additionally, unlike machine learning and data-mining, rule-based detection
has been used in the proposed model. Finally, in contrast to other works, we prefer to
use combined log format in order to make the number of features larger and to get more
consistent results.
1.2 Contributions
The motivation of the relevant work is quite different, typically focusing on machine-
learning based predictive detection of malicious activities. Actually, all machine learning
algorithms have training phase and training data to built a classification model. In order
to increase accuracy of machine learning classifier model, a large scale input training
data is needed. In turn, the larger scale input data is, the more memory consumption
increases. As a result, either the model would turn out to be not trainable, or training
phase would last for days. On the other hand, executing the proposed rule set on access
logs does not cause any memory consumption problems. Our script simply runs on
Ubuntu terminal with a single line of code.
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Moreover, another negative aspect of focusing on machine learning is overfitting [16, 17];
referring to a model that models the training data too well. Using a very complex
models may result in overfitting that may negatively influence the model’s predictive
performance and generalization ability [18]. Nevertheless, we design our rules to operate
on past data which allows a detailed analysis of a user’s actions [8] so that the complexity
of our approach is not too high.
The proposed model addresses the detection of web vulnerability scans on web applica-
tions by analysing log files retrieved from web servers. Since most of the web servers
log HTTP requests by default, data is easily available to be analysed. Thus, any extra
configuration, installation, purchase or data format modification are not needed. Fur-
thermore, our analysis is based upon rule-based detection strategy and we built our rule
set on several features of log entries. As opposed to relevant work, the number of these
features is low enough to make input data less complex.
Finally, our work contributes to a better understanding of current web security vul-
nerabilities. For example, we can detect web vulnerability scanners and learn about
vulnerability itself at the same time.
1.3 Outline
This thesis consists of five chapters:
Chapter 1 provides brief introduction on web vulnerability scanners, web application
attacks and their effects on web application security. Then, a literature review on detec-
tion methods of attack-oriented scans was given, and followed by contributions of this
thesis.
Chapter 2 introduces some basic web concepts such as Combined Log Format, Hyper-
text Transfer Protocol, Robots Exclusion Standard and two common character encodings
in accordance with existing standards. We also briefly explain these concepts by speci-
fying the purposes of their use in the context of the thesis.
Chapter 3 describes the environmental design used for the data and log generation, also
gives several details about the web applications, automated web vulnerability scanning
tools and web servers. Besides, we point out our methodology and rules in details.
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Chapter 4 is focused on results obtained in this thesis. Firstly, we summarize our
experimental setup and data sets and after we evaluate our model according to the
confusion matrix and the related metrics. Thereafter, we test our model using live data
and sump up the detection results.
Chapter 5 summarizes and concludes the thesis.
Chapter 2
Basic Concepts
2.1 Apache HTTP Server Access Log
Logging information about HTTP requests could be beneficial for troubleshooting and
optimizing a website [19]. Web servers provide and store these important records through
their access log files. Indeed, access logs give several details about the end users who had
requested for the web sites in a web server.
In this thesis, analysis of the access log files is based upon two most widely used web
servers which are Apache HTTP Server and Internet Information Services (IIS) Server
[20].
2.1.1 Access Log Formats
Changing the format of access logs enables to change their content. Common Log Format
and Combined Log Format (CLF) are two common formats of Apache HTTP Server
access logs [21]. Combined Log Format is similar to the other format with only two
additional fields which are "Referer" and "User-agent". Throughout this thesis, because
of its detailed content, Combined Log Format will be used.
The default log file format for IIS server is World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) Ex-
tended Log File Format [22, 23]. Since W3C Extended Log File Format could be usually
converted to CLF by some log conversion tools (e.g. Webalizer [24]), investigating only
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one of these web servers that is; Apache’s CLF format, would be sufficient for the scope
of this thesis.
A sample configuration of CLF made in CustomLog directive of Apache HTTP Server
is given below:
The log file entries produced in CLF will look as follows:
«192.168.4.33 - - [30/Apr/2015:15:28:43 +0300] "GET /dvwa/
HTTP/1.0" 302 500 "-" "Opera/7.54 (Windows NT 5.1; U) [en]"»
Each part of this log entry is described below [21]:
• 192.168.4.33 (%h) » The IP address of the client which made the request to the
server.
• - (%l) » RFC 1413 identity of the client determined by The Identification Protocol
(a.k.a., "ident") daemon on the clients machine. The hyphen "-" shows that the
requested information is not available.
• - (%u) » The user id of the person in client side as determined by HTTP authen-
tication.
• [30/Apr/2015:15:28:43 +0300] (%t) » The time when the request was made.
The time is formatted as [day/month/year: hour: minute: second zone].
• "GET /dvwa/ HTTP/1.0" (\"%r\") » The request of the client is given in
double quotes. GET is the HTTP method used. /dvwa/ is the requested resource
from the server. HTTP/1.0 is the protocol used by the client.
• 302 (%>s) » The status code sent by the server.
• 500 (%b) » The size of the object returned to the client by the server. This size
does not include the size of the response headers.
• - (\"%{Referrer}i\") » The information of the referrer that is the page providing
a link to the requested page.
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• "Opera/7.54 (Windows NT 5.1; U) [en]" (\"%{User-agent}i\") » The
browser information provided by the client.
2.2 Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTP is an application layer protocol in both OSI Model and (Transmission Control
Protocol/Internet Protocol) TCP/IP Hierarchy. HTTP is the protocol to exchange or
transfer hypertext which is designed for the use of hyperlinks [25]. It is a request-
response protocol, stateless and object-oriented protocol. A client requests for resources
like Hyper-Text Markup Language (HTML) files, image files, etc. hosted in a web server
and gets the related response via HTTP. HTTP has been in use by the World-Wide
Web global information initiative for delivering data since 1990 [26]. HTTP generally
works over TCP/IP in transport layer; but, can be adapted to User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) too. The default port for HTTP is TCP/IP 80 and for HyperText Transport
Protocol Secure (HTTPS) is TCP/IP 443 [27]. Its versions and related release dates are
respectively; HTTP V0.9 in 1991, HTTP V1.0 in 1996, HTTP/1.1 in 1997 and updated
in 1999 under Request for Comments (RFC) 2616 and lastly HTTP/2 in 2015 under
RFC 7540 [25].
2.2.1 HTTP Header Fields
HTTP header fields contain information about the client browser, the requested page,
the server and more. They are parts of HTTP headers found in both HTTP response and
request. Thanks to HTTP header fields, fore-mentioned access log entries are formed.
The HTTP header fields used in the context of the thesis are listed below [28]:
Accept-Encoding: This request-header field restricts the content-codings that are ac-
ceptable in the response.
Example » "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch"
Allow: This entity-header field indicates which HTTP methods are supported in server
side for the requested resource that is identified by the Request-URI.
Example » "Allow: GET, HEAD, PUT"
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Date: This general-header field shows the date and time of the request and the response.
it must be formatted as defined in RFC 1123.
Example » "Date: Wed, 06 Jan 2016 16:26:30 GMT"
Host: This request-header field states the Internet host and port number of the re-
quested resource and obtained from the original URI given by the client.
Example » "Host: www.google-analytics.com"
If-Modified-Since: if the requested resource has not been modified since the time spec-
ified in this request-header field, an entity will not be returned from the server;
instead, a 304 (not modified) response will be returned to the client. This field has
been usually used by bots, crawlers, etc.
Example » "If-Modified-Since: Tue, 06 Sep 2014 14:28:30 GMT"
Referer: This request-header field allows specifying the address of the resource from
which the Request-URI was obtained.
Example » "Referer: http://www.myshoppingpage.com/index.htm"
User-Agent: This request-header field contains information about the user agent orig-
inating the request.
Example » "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWe-
bKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/47.0.2526.106 Safari/537.36"
2.3 HTTP Methods
HTTP methods identify the actions to be performed on the requested resource. Client’s
request contains this method token. If the server does not allow the requested method,
it should give a response with the status code 405 (Method Not Allowed). According to
the RFC 2616, there exist two types of HTTP methods; Safe Methods and Idempotent
Methods [28]. Some of the important HTTP methods; that are also found in our access
logs, are listed below [25]:
CONNECT: This method allows the connection to switch tunnelling (e.g. Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) tunnelling) with a proxy.
DELETE: This method asks the server for deleting the resource identified by the
Request-URI.
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GET: This method allows to retrieve the resource identified by the Request-URI.
HEAD: This method is similar to the GET method, but its response does not include
the response body. It may be used for obtaining meta information about the
requested resource.
OPTIONS: This method allows the client to know the methods supported for a re-
source, or the capabilities of a server.
POST: This method asks the server for accepting the entity enclosed in the request as
a new record of the Request-URI.
PRI: This method cannot be used by an actual client. This method will appear to be
used when an HTTP/1.1 server or intermediary attempts to parse an HTTP/2
connection preface [29].
PROPFIND: This method exists in Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (Web-
DAV); that is an extension of the HTTP. It is used to retrieve properties, stored
as Extensible Markup Language (XML), from a web resource [30].
PUT: This method asks the server for storing the entity enclosed in the request under
the Request-URI.
TRACE: This method is used to invoke a remote, application layer loop-back of the
request message. It allows the client for obtaining testing or diagnostic information
about the server side.
TRACK: This method is identical to TRACE method, but it is used in IIS servers [31].
2.4 HTTP Status Codes
As a three-digit integer, status code represents how the server understands and satisfies
the request. Its first digit defines the class of response. The other digits do not have any
categorization role. Even if HTPP applications does not require to understand all of the
status codes in RFC 2616, they must understand at least their classes. As stated below,
there exist five different class of status codes[28]:
• 1xx (Informational): The request was received, continuing process.
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• 2xx (Successful): The request was successfully received, understood, and ac-
cepted.
• 3xx (Redirection): Further action needs to be taken in order to complete the
request.
• 4xx (Client Error): The request contains bad syntax or cannot be fulfilled.
• 5xx (Server Error): The server failed to fulfil an apparently valid request.
Some of the important HTTP status codes; that are also found in our access logs, are
listed below [32]:
• 200-OK: Success in the request whose response depends upon the HTTP method
used in the request.
• 206-Partial Content: This status code is used as a response for a If-Range
request and the server gives only part of the requested resource.
• 301-Moved Permanently: New permanent URI should be used for the requested
resource and it should be stated in the Location field of the response.
• 302-Found: New temporary URI should be used for the requested resource, but
the existing URI could be used for future requests.
• 304-Not Modified: This status code is used as a response for If-Modified-Since
or If-None-Match request header fields and indicates that there is no modification
in the resource since the specified time in the request.
• 400-Bad Request: The request is not valid and the server cannot process it.
• 403-Forbidden: The request is valid, but the server blocks the resource by reason
of some permissions issues.
• 404-Not Found: The requested resource related to the Request-URI is not found
by the server.
• 405-Method Not Allowed: The method in the request is not allowed for the
requested resource, but server’s response should include the allowed methods.
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• 406-Not Acceptable: The content characteristics of the requested resource is not
acceptable for the accept header fields in the request.
• 408-Request Timeout: The client did not complete the request within the spec-
ified time frame.
• 416-Requested Range Not Satisfiable: The values of Range header field in
the request are not valid for the requested resource.
• 500-Internal Server Error: The server does not process the request by reason
of an unexpected condition.
• 501-Not Implemented: The server does not have the ability to process the
request.
2.5 Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI)
URIs are also known as World Wide Web (WWW) addresses, Universal Document Iden-
tifiers, and the combination of URLs and Uniform Resource Names (URN). URIs are
formatted strings of characters to identify a web resource. Identification of a resource
may be done by a name (URN), location (URL) or any other characteristics [28]. An
usual form of URI is:
"scheme:[//[user:password@]host[:port]][/]path[?query]" [33].
According to RFC 2396 [34], URI has four components that are listed and shortly ex-
plained below:
1. Scheme Component; e.g. http, ftp, etc.,
2. Authority Component; a host name or an IP address followed by an optional
port number,
3. Path Component; path that contains the target resource on the host side.
"?": The first question mark is used as a separator between path and query strings,
and is not part of the query string.
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4. Query Component; a string of information to be interpreted by the resource.
Two of the most common parameters in query strings are listed below:
"&": A sequence of parameters and their assigned values are separated by the
ampersand.
"=": The field name and value in query string are separated by an equals sign.
For example, a client requesting the following URI; "http://www.domain.com/where?
a=today", starts a TCP connection to port 80 of the host "www.domain.com" and sends
the following lines to the server:
GET /where?a=today HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.org
A locator, a name, or both could be used to classify a URI [34]. URL is used to identify
resources via a representation of their primary access mechanism, while URN is used to
serve as persistent, location-independent, resource identifiers [35].
2.6 Encoding
Encoding maps a scalar domain to a byte range (and vice versa). In fact, characters,
such as letters, symbols and numbers, are converted to bytes according to the rule set
defined with encoding. The reason for encoding is to make data transmission and storage
more efficient. Data in the form of encoding used in web servers should be sent correctly
to browsers and other user agents, so that they can interpret the bits and bytes properly.
Some important types of encoding schemes are HTML Encoding, URL Encoding, Uni-
code Encoding (Unicode Transformation Format-8 (UTF-8), UTF-16), Base64 Encoding
and Hex Encoding. UTF-8, Universal Character Set-2 (UCS-2), UTF-16, UCS-4 and
UTF-32 are encoding schemes defined by International Standards Organization/Interna-
tional Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) 10646 and Unicode [36]. Even though,
today’s web servers and browsers support different encoding types, throughout this the-
sis, only UTF-8 and Hex Encodings will be taken into account.
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2.6.1 UTF-8 Encoding
The Unicode Standard defines UTF-8. UTF-8 encodes UCS characters to the character in
ISO/IEC 10646. Character numbers from U+0000 to U+007F (United States-American
Standard Code for Information (US-ASCII) repertoire) correspond to octets 00 to 7F (7
bit US-ASCII values) [36]. For instance, the character sequence "\u002 \u0077 \u0068
\u0065 \u0072 \u0065 \u003f \u0061 \u003d \u0074 \u006f\u0064 \u0061 \u0079" for
"/where?a=today" is encoded in UTF-8 as follows: "2C A1 5B 3C 31 11 D2 CD 47 20
92 25 15 EA 1E 8A 3C 6A D1 EA FA FE 6A 77 0C 8A 93 19"
2.6.2 Hex/Base 16 Encoding
Hex encoding uses 16-character subset of US-ASCII. A printable character is presented
by four bits. The domain of the Base 16; that is 8-bit groups (octets), is mapped to the
range of Base 16; that is strings of 2 encoded characters. From left to right, an 8-bit
input is taken and is treated as 2 concatenated 4-bit groups, each of which is translated
into a single character in the base 16 alphabet [37]. For instance, the character sequence
"/where?a=today" is encoded in Hex as follows: "2f77686572653f613d746f646179"
2.7 Robots Exclusion Standard
Robots Exclusion Standard (a.k.a. Robots Exclusion Protocol and robots.txt) repre-
sents an access policy for a website. Thanks to this standard, the way how web robots
crawl or scan a website could be declared [38]. Restrictions and permissions related to
some resources or some robots could be announced via "robots.txt" file and it must be
accessible via HTTP on the local URL "/robots.txt". An empty robots.txt file means
that all web robots can visit all sources of the website. This file starts with one or more
User-agent lines, followed by one or more Disallow lines, as detailed below [39–41]:
User-agent: This field is the subject of the following Disallow fields and it gets the
name of a web robot as a value. if otherwise stated; when its value gets "*" sign, it
means that all robots should pay attention to the following field.
Disallow: This field represents a resource restriction for the robots identified in the
preceding User-agent fields. If this value is empty, all URLs can be retrieved by the
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specified web robots. According to the standard [39], at least one Disallow field needs to
be present in robots.txt file.
Examples
1. In the following example, crawling the website’s resources whose URL starts with
/dvwa/xss/ and /bin/ is restricted for all robots:
User-agent: *
Disallow: /dvwa/xss/
Disallow: /bin/
2. In the following example, crawling the website’s resources whose URL starts with
/dvwa/xss/ is restricted for all robots, except "crawler-master":
User-agent: *
Disallow: /dvwa/xss/
User-agent: crawler-master
Disallow:
3. In the following example, crawling all website’s resources is restricted for all robots:
User-agent: *
Disallow: /
Chapter 3
System Model
In this chapter, the proposed model in the context of the thesis will be explained. We
will first touch on the assumptions, explain the log generation later, and finally, explain
how the rules and data classification are established.
3.1 Assumptions
• In access logs, POST data can not get logged [42]. Thus, the proposed method
cannot capture this sort of data.
• Browsers or application servers may support other encodings. Since only two of
them are in the context of this thesis, our script cannot capture data encoded in
other styles.
• Our model is designed for detection of two well-known web application attacks and
malicious web vulnerability scans, not for prevention. Thus, working in-line mod
is not included in the context of our research.
3.2 Data and Log Generation
In this section, tools, applications, virtual environment used throughout this thesis and
their installation and configuration settings are explained.
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3.2.1 Virtual Machines
In order to run virtual machines, VMware Workstation 12 Player (Version 12.1.0 build-
3272444) has been chosen. The reason for this choice is that VMware virtualization ap-
plication offers improved virtual machine performance with an easy set-up [43]. VMware
has been running on a computer in which Windows 10 Pro was installed. In the context
of this thesis, two virtual machines were created. One of them is used as a web server,
the other is generally used for vulnerability scanning purposes.
3.2.2 Guest Operating Systems
One of the guest operating systems is Ubuntu 14.04 LTS whose OS type is 64-bit since
it has new versions of many applications, newer kernel and also long term support. This
virtual machine has 2 GB memory, and 20 GB hard disk and its network adapter setting
is configured as bridged.
The other guest operating system is Kali GNU/Linux 2.0 to take advantage of its newer
Debian packages and more advanced penetration testing platform. This virtual machine
has 1.9 GB memory, and 20 GB hard disk and its network adapter setting is configured
as bridged too.
3.2.3 Web Servers
3.2.3.1 Apache HTTP Server
As mentioned earlier, Apache/2.4.7 (Ubuntu) Server is chosen as a web server. Apache
is known to be the most commonly used web server. According to the W3Techs (Web
Technology Surveys) [44], as of December 1, 2016; Apache is used by 51.2 percent of
all web servers. In addition, it is open source, highly scalable and has a dynamically
loadable module system. Apache installation is made via apt-get command-line package
manager. Any extra configuration is not necessary for the scope of this thesis.
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3.2.3.2 Apache Tomcat
The Apache Tomcat being an implementation of the Java Servlet, JavaServer Pages,
Java Expression Language and Java WebSocket technologies, is an open source software
[45]. In this thesis, Apache Tomcat Version 8.0.33 is used. Atlassian JIRA Standalone
Edition (Jira 3.19.0-25-generic #26) is used as a web application. Access log configuration
of Tomcat is shown in Figure 3.1. Thanks to this configuration, access log entries in
Tomcat is identical to access log entries in Apache.
Figure 3.1: Tomcat Access Log Valves
3.2.4 Damn Vulnerable Web Application (DVWA)
DVWA is a vulnerable PHP/MySQL web application. It is designed to help web de-
velopers find out critical web application security vulnerabilities by hands on activity.
Different from illegal website-hacking, it offers a totally legal environment to exploit for
security people. Thanks to DVWA; Brute Force, Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF),
Command Execution, XSS (reflected) and SQL Injection vulnerabilities could be tested
for three security levels; low, medium, high.
In this thesis, DVWA 1.0.8 version (Release date: 11/01/2011) is used. To install this web
application, Linux Apache MySQL PHP (LAMP) Server; including MySql, PHP5, and
phpMyAdmin, has been installed. The reasons for studying with DVWA are to better
understand XSS and SQL Injection attacks and to find out related payloads substituted
in query string part of URIs. In this way, rule selection to detect these attacks from
access logs could be correctly determined. Also, web vulnerability scanners used in this
thesis, have scanned this web application for data collection purposes.
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3.2.5 Web Vulnerability Scanners
3.2.5.1 Acunetix
Acunetix is one of the most commonly used commercial web vulnerability scanners.
Acunetix scans a web site according to the determined configurations, produces a report
about the existing vulnerabilities, groups them as high, medium, low and informational;
and identifies the threat level of the web application with the related mitigation rec-
ommendations [46]. In the context of this thesis, Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner
(WVS) Reporter v7.0 has been used with default scanning configurations in addition to
site login information.
3.2.5.2 Netsparker
Netsparker is a web application security scanner that is commercial too. Netsparker
detects security vulnerabilities of a web application and produces a report including
mitigation solutions. In addition, detected vulnerabilities could be exploited to confirm
the report results [47]. In the context of this thesis, Netsparker Microsoft Software
Library (MSL) Internal Build 4.6.1.0 along with Vulnerability Database 2016.10.27.1533
has been used with special scanning configurations including custom cookie information.
3.2.5.3 Web Application Attack and Audit Framework (W3AF)
W3af is an open source web application security scanner. W3af is developed using
Python and licensed under General Public License (GPL) v2.0. Framework is designed
to help web administrators secure the web applications. W3af could detect more than 200
vulnerabilities [48]. W3af has several plug-ins for different operations such as crawling,
brute forcing, firewall bypassing etc. W3af comes by default in Kali Linux and could be
found in "Applications/Web Application Analysis/Web Vulnerability Scanners". W3af
version 1.6.54 has been used with "fast-scan" profile through audit, crawl, grep and
output plugins.
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3.3 Rules and Methodology
As mentioned earlier, our script runs on access log files. The main reason for this choice
is the opportunity for detailed analysis about users actions. By examining past data,
information security policies for the web applications could be correctly created and
implemented. Additionally, further exploitations could be prevented in advance. Unlike
the proposed model, Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) may not detect attacks
when HTTPS is used [8]. However, working with logs has some disadvantages. Since
log files do not contain all data of HTTP request and response, some important data
could not be analysed. For example, POST parameters that are vulnerable to injections
attacks could not be logged by web servers. Another negative aspects are the size of logs
and parsing difficulty. Nevertheless, to solve this problem, we separate the access log
files on a daily basis. Therefore, web administrators might run our script every day to
check for an attack. Lastly, real-time detection and prevention is not possible with the
proposed method which runs oﬄine [49]. Thus, we could not guarantee to run on-line.
In fact, this approach is conceptually sufficient for the scope of this thesis. Differently
from the test environment; an extra module that directly accesses logs, or a script that
analyses logs faster could be developed to use our approach in a live or real environment.
Our method could be described as rule-based detection. Unlike anomaly based detection,
our rules are static including both blacklist and whitelist approaches [50]. In detail, XSS
and SQL injection detection part of our method is a positive security model; on the other
hand, the rest is a negative security model [51]. Thus, data evasion is tried to be kept
at a minimum level. In order to classify IP addresses in the access log file, we identify
three different visitor types as follows:
• Type 1: Regular (normal) users with a normal (natural) visit.
• Type 2: Crawlers, bots, spiders or robots.
• Type 3: Malicious users using automated web vulnerability scanners.
As shown in Figure 3.2 in Phase 1, our first step is to detect SQL injection and XSS
attacks. Although different places of HTTP (the HTTP body, URI) could be used to
exploit a vulnerability [8]; we will analyse path and query parts of the requested URI for
detection.
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Figure 3.2: Decision Tree of the Proposed Rule-Based Model
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In detail; for XSS, we use regular expressions to recognize some patterns such as HTML
tags, ’src’ parameter of the ’img’ tag and some Javascript event handlers. Likewise; for
SQL injection, we check the existence of the singlequote, the doubledash, ’#’, exec()
function and some SQL keywords. In addition, since there is a possibility for URL
obfuscation, Hex and UTF-8 encodings of these patterns are also taken in consideration.
Afterwards, we continue by separating IP addresses of Type 2 from the rest of the access
log file in Phase 2. To do this, two different approaches are used. Firstly, user-agent part
of all log entries is compared with the user-agent list from robots database that is publicly
available in [52]. However, since this list may not be up-to-date, another bot detection
rules are added. In order to identify these rules, we use the following observations about
web robots:
1. Most of the web robots make a request for "/robots.txt" file [53].
2. Web robots have higher rate of "4xx" requests since they usually request unavail-
able pages [54–57].
3. Web robots have higher unassigned referrer ("-") rates [57–59].
4. According to the access logs that we analysed, user-agent header field of web robots
may contain some keywords such as bot, crawler, spider, wanderer, robot etc.
As a result of above mentioned observations, we add some extra rules to correctly dis-
tinguish Type 2 from other visitors.
HTTP Method Number
Connect 2
Get 2,758
Options 2
Post 668
Trace 2
Track 2
TOTAL 3,434
Table 3.1: HTTP Methods in
Acunetix
HTTP Method Number
Get 3,059
Head 590
Netsparker 1
Options 14
Post 956
Propfind 14
TOTAL 4,634
Table 3.2: HTTP Methods in
Netsparker
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HTTP Status Code Number
200 598
301 38
302 686
400 44
403 16
404 2,022
405 4
406 2
417 2
500 20
501 2
TOTAL 3,434
Table 3.3: HTTP Status Codes in
Acunetix
HTTP Status Code Number
200 177
301 1
302 23
404 494
500 6
TOTAL 701
Table 3.4: HTTP Status Codes in
Netsparker
HTTP Status Code Number
200 91
302 8
404 30
500 6
TOTAL 135
Table 3.5: HTTP Status Codes in
W3af
For the rest our rule set as indicated at Phase 3 in Figure 3.2, we continue by investigating
our access log files formed as a result of vulnerability scanning mentioned in the previous
section. As shown in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, our first immediate observation is that
as compared to Type 2 and Type 1, Type 3’s requests include different HTTP methods;
such as Track, Trace, Netsparker, Pri, Propfind and Quit. Secondly, as shown in Table
3.3, Table 3.4 and Table 3.5; we deduct that status codes of Type 3 differ from Type
2 and Type 1. In fact, Type 3 has higher rate of "404" requests, average of which for
Acunetix, Netsparker and W3af is 31% in our data set. Thus, we generate a rule to
check the presence of these HTTP methods and the percentage of "404" requests. User-
agent header fields of Type 3 could generally be modified and obfuscated manually at
the configuration phase before vulnerability scan. Even so, we made a list of well-known
automated web vulnerability scanners, and compare it with user-agent header fields.
Finally, we notice that these scanners make at least more than 100 HTTP requests in a
certain time, we select this value as a threshold for Type 3 detection.
The pseudo code of the proposed model is shown in Algorithm 1:
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Algorithm 1: Pseudo-Code for Proposed Model
Input : Access log file, IP
Output: Set of IP addresses of web scans and XSS or SQLI attacks
begin
for log_line ∈ access_log_file do
res←− CheckXSSorSQLI(log_line) ;
if res ∈ {XSS, SQLI} then
return IP ;
. Set1
end
res←− CheckUA(log_line) ;
if res ∈ {bot_list} then
remove IP ;
end
res1←− CheckURI(log_line) ;
res2←− CheckUA(log_line) ;
res3←− CheckReferer(log_line) ;
res4←− CheckStatusCode(log_line) ;
if res1 == ”/robots.txt” and
res2 ∈ {”bot”, ”crawler”, ”spider”, ”robot”, ”wanderer”} and res3 == ”− ”
and res4 ∈ {400, 404} then
remove IP ;
end
res←− CheckUA(log_line) ;
if res ∈ {wvs_UA_list} then
return IP ;
. Set2
end
res1←− Check#ofRequests(IP ) ;
res2←− CheckHttpMethod(log_line) ;
res3←− CheckReferer(log_line) ;
if res1 > 100 and
res2 ∈ {”Track”, ”Trace”, ”Netsparker”, ”Pri”, ”Propfind”, ”Quit”} and
res3 > 31 then
return IP ;
. Set3
end
returnUnion(Set1, Set2, Set3) ;
end
end
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Results
4.1 Experimental Setup
To implement our rules, Python programming language version 3.5 has been chosen.
Script is executed on Ubuntu operating system mentioned in Section 3.2.2 via terminal.
To parse log lines, "apache-log-parser 1.7.0" which is a Python package has been used
[60]. As well as, we benefit from python libraries that are collections, datetime, numpy,
ua-parser and argparse.
Since there are not any actual, publicly available and labelled data sets to evaluate our
model, we create our data sets. In fact, we deploy two different web applications on two
different web servers to form Type 1 and Type 3 traffics. Details are expressed in Section
3.2.2.
Type 1 (normal traffic) is the data set collected from Jira Software as a web application
running on Tomcat web server during 4 days.The size of the related access log file is
16.3 MB. As shown Table 4.1, log file contains 62,539 log entries from 15 different IP
addresses. These requests are generated in a local network.
For Type 2 traffic, an external traffic that is open to the internet is needed. To this
end, we make use of three different access log files retrieved from a company website. In
detail, log files contain crawling data collected during 13 days from requests of several
web robots. The size of the related access log files is totally 6.4 MB, and log files contain
28,804 log entries from 143 different IP addresses as shown Table 4.1.
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To generate Type 3 traffic, DVWA running on Apache HTTP Server is used as a web
application. Before scanning, the security level of DVWA is configured as low secu-
rity. Moreover, we scan this application via Acunetix, Netsparker and and W3af as web
vulnerability scanners. Firstly, DVWA is scanned for 22 minutes and 22 seconds with
Acunetix. The size of the related access log file is 1.6 MB, and log file contains 6,539 log
entries from one IP address. Secondly, DVWA is scanned for 19 minutes and 56 seconds
with Netsparker. The size of the related access log file is 1.9 MB, and log files contains
7,314 log entries from one IP address. Lastly, DVWA is scanned for 2 minutes and 6
seconds with W3af. The size of the related access log file is 558 KB, and log files contains
3,996 log entries from two IP addresses as shown Table 4.1.
For the evaluation of the proposed model, we combine all mentioned access log files into
one file that is our general data set. Then, we run our Python script on the mentioned
data set.
Visitor Type Log File Line Number IP Number
Type 1 Normal 62,539 15
Type 2 Web Robot 28,804 143
Type 3 Acunetix 6,539 1
Type 3 Netsparker 7,314 1
Type 3 W3af 3,996 2
Type 1, 2 and 3 TOTAL 109,192 162
Table 4.1: Details of Classified Data Sets
4.2 Model Evaluation
Initially, to evaluate the proposed model, we compute the confusion matrix where TP,
FN, FP, and TN denote true negatives, false negatives, false positives, and true negatives
respectively as shown in Table 4.2 [61].
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Actual:
Type 3
Actual:
Type 1 or 2
Predicted:
Type 3
TP = 3 FN = 1
Predicted:
Type 1 or 2
FP = 0 TN = 158
Table 4.2: Confusion Matrix
After, we evaluate the following measures:
accuracy(acc) =
(TN + TP )
(TN + FN + FP + TP )
precision(prec) =
(TP )
(TP + FP )
recall(rec) =
(TP )
(TP + FN)
F1 score =
(2TP )
(2TP + FP + FN)
(4.1)
More specifically, the accuracy provides the percentage of Type 3 that are detected
correctly. The precision determines the fraction of IP addresses correctly classified as
Type 3 over all IP addresses classified as Type 3 [62]. The recall (a.k.a. sensitivity) is
the fraction of IP addresses correctly classified as Type 3 over all IP addresses of Type
3. Finally, the F1-score is a harmonic mean of precision and recall [63]. As a result, our
model has 99.38% accuracy, 100.00% precision, 75.00% recall and finally 85.71% F1 score
as we can see in Table 4.3.
IP Number Accuracy Precision Recall F1
162 99.38% 100.00% 75.00% 85.71%
Table 4.3: Summary of Results for General Data Set
4.3 Scan Detection on Live Data
We have built or model according to the data sets mentioned in Section 4.1. Additionally,
we test our model according to several large-scale, live, not labelled and publicly available
data sets. In this section, we share our test results illustrated in tables and graphs.
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In accordance with this purpose, we have used log samples from real systems [64]. As
stated in the related web source, these samples are collected from various systems, secu-
rity devices, applications, etc.; and neither Chuvakin nor we did not sanitize, anonymized
or modified them in any way. Since they include HTTP access logs, we have chosen the
log samples named Bundle 9, Bundle 7, Bundle 1, Bundle 4 and Bundle 3. For the rest
of the thesis, these bundles are expressed as Data Set 1, Data Set 2, Data Set 3, Data
Set 4 and Data Set 5 respectively.
Log File File Size Line Number IP Number
Data Set 1 43 MB 202,145 3,910
Data Set 2 13.4 MB 34.487 9.269
Data Set 3 7.2 MB 36.310 4.719
Data Set 4 1.3 MB 5.936 1.795
Data Set 5 0.48 MB 3.554 579
TOTAL 65.37 MB 282,432 20,272
Table 4.4: Details of Log Samples
To detail, Data Set 1 contains log files collected during 5 days. As shown in Table 4.4, the
size of the related access log file is 43 MB, and log file contains 202,145 log entries from
3,910 different IP addresses. Data Set 2 contains log files collected during 7 months. The
size of the related access log file is 13.4 MB, and log file contains 34,487 log entries from
9,269 different IP addresses. Data Set 3 contains log files collected during 9 months. The
size of the related access log file is 7.2 MB, and log file contains 36,310 log entries from
4,719 different IP addresses. Data Set 4 contains log files collected during 3 months. The
size of the related access log file is 1.3 MB, and log file contains 5,936 log entries from
1,795 different IP addresses. Data Set 5 contains log files collected during 3 months. The
size of the related access log file is 0.48 MB, and log file contains 3,554 log entries from
579 different IP addresses as illustrated in Table 4.4.
As shown in Table 4.5, in order to test the log samples, Data Set 1, Data Set 2, Data Set
3, Data Set 4 and Data Set 5 are divided into daily, monthly, monthly, 15-day and 15-day
periods respectively. For Data Set 1; 13, 20, 22, 39 and 21 Type 3 IP addresses have been
detected on 10 March 2004, 11 March 2004, 12 March 2004, 13 March 2004 and 14 March
2004 respectively. For Data Set 2; 1, 3, 6, 4, 1, 0 and 1 Type 3 IP addresses have been
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detected in April, May, June, July, August, September and October respectively. For
Data Set 3; 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 19, 1, 45 and 34 Type 3 IP addresses have been detected in April,
May, June, July, August, September and October respectively. For Data Set 4; 1, 0, 0, 1,
0 and 0 Type 3 IP addresses have been detected in 1-15/June/2005, 16-30/June/2005, 1-
15/July/2005, 16-30/July/2005, 1-15/August/2005 and 16-30/August/2005 respectively.
Lastly, for Data Set 5; 0, 0, 0, 3, and 0 Type 3 IP addresses have been detected in
16-31/January/2005, 1-15/February/2005, 16-28/February/2005, 1-15/March/2005 and
16-30/March/2005 respectively.
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Data Set Period IP Number Type 3 IP Number Type 3 Percentage
Data Set 1
10/March/2004 370 13 3.51%
11/March/2004 786 20 2.54%
12/March/2004 1,002 22 2.20%
13/March/2004 1,960 39 1,99%
14/March/2004 1,079 21 1,95%
Data Set 2
April/2004 3,140 1 0.03%
May/2004 4,546 3 0.07%
June/2004 701 6 0.86%
July/2004 735 4 0.54%
August/2004 189 1 0.53%
September/2004 280 0 0.00%
October/2004 106 1 0.94%
Data Set 3
June/2005 663 1 0.15%
July/2005 755 1 0.13%
August/2005 577 0 0.00%
September/2005 731 1 0.14%
October/2005 452 0 0.00%
November/2005 623 19 3.05%
December/2005 181 1 0.55%
January/2006 652 45 6.90%
February/2006 802 34 4.24%
Data Set 4
1-15/June/2005 160 1 0.63%
16-30/June/2005 497 0 0.00%
1-15/July/2005 503 0 0.00%
16-30/July/2005 280 1 0.36%
1-15/August/2005 284 0 0.00%
16-30/August/2005 282 0 0.00%
Data Set 5
16-31/January/2005 28 0 0.00%
1-15/February/2005 176 0 0.00%
16-28/February/2005 112 0 0.00%
1-15/March/2005 225 3 1.33%
16-30/March/2005 28 0 0.00%
Table 4.5: Data Sets Test Results
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Type 3 percentage of each data set is shown in Figure 4.1-4.5.
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Figure 4.1: Data Set 1
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this thesis, we studied web vulnerability scans detection through access log files of
web servers in addition to detection of XSS and SQLI attacks. In accordance with this
purpose, we used rule-based methodology. Firstly, we examined the behaviour of the
automated vulnerability scanners. Moreover, we implemented our model with a Python
script. Afterwards, our model has been evaluated based on data we have collected.
Finally, we tested our model on the log samples from real systems.
It is clear that our method has very high probability of detection and low probability
of false alarm. More specifically, the accuracy and the precision rates of our model are
99.38%, 100.00% respectively. More importantly, malicious scans can be captured more
precisely because different types of scanning tools including both open source and com-
mercial tools were examined. Therefore, our results indicates that static rules can detect
successfully web vulnerability scans. Besides, we have observed that our model functions
properly with larger and live data sets and correctly detects Type 3 IP addresses.
Future work considerations related to this thesis are twofold. In the first place, one
could make our model possible to analyse other log files such as audit log, error log etc.
Secondly, in addition to the scope of this thesis; different from SQLI and XSS attacks,
other well-known web application attacks like CSRF could be addressed too.
The results presented in this thesis may enhance researches about malicious web scans
and may support the development of attack detection studies.
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